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Abstract: Large-scale assessment (LSA) is a tool used by education authorities for several purposes, 
including the promotion of teacher-based instructional change. In Canada, all 10 provinces engage 
in large-scale testing across several grade levels and subjects, and also have the common 
expectation that the results data will be used to improve instruction in classrooms. Yet despite 
agreement between ministries that instructional change based on LSA results is a positive 
development and employs data-based decision making at its heart, there remain significant 
differences in the kinds of incentives written into assessment policies in Canada. It is also true that 
implementation of the policies is less than uniform between schools and school divisions. Using 
mixed methods (survey data and follow-up interviews), this study examines which policy factors 
have the most significant impact on teacher decisions regarding the use of data. The findings 
indicate that highly incentivized policies correlate well to instructional change, including aspects of 
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both teaching (to) the curriculum as well as teaching to the test. Since the latter will be examined as 
a neither an educationally defensible practice nor a stated policy goal, the statement that ‘incentives 
work’ does not fully capture the nature of these impacts. 
Key words: Educational assessment, decision making, reactivity, instructional improvement, 
education policy, Canada 
 
 
Policy Incentives in Canadian Large-Scale Assessment: How Policy Levers 
Influence Teacher Decisions about Instructional Change 
 
Large-scale assessment (LSA) is a tool used by education authorities for several stated policy 
purposes. In Canada, all 10 provinces engage in large-scale testing across several grade levels and 
subjects, and also share the common expectation that the results data will be used to improve 
instruction in classrooms. From policy-level purposes for testing (which include such goals as 
improving curriculum) down to classroom-level goals (like helping to identify struggling students), 
education ministries in Canada have been quite ambitious. Between five and nine distinct policy goals 
have been included in provincial education ministry literature (Copp, 2016b). Setting expectations for 
this many goals using a single assessment instrument is quite a formidable challenge (Schildkamp & 
Kuiper, 2010; Ungerleider, 2006). 
In order to prod the education sector toward meaningful improvement, compliance with the 
mandates of LSA policies is necessary. It has long been the position of New Policy Management 
advocates and education economists that incentives are the most effective means to insure 
compliance and to achieve controlled changes in behaviour (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Hanushek & 
Rivkin, 2012; Woessman, 2001). Incentives of various kinds have been employed in this pursuit but 
with only mixed results (Ballou & Springer, 2015; Chambers & Tate, 2015; Corcoran, 2010). The 
most commonly utilized incentives for teachers and/or schools have included: a) pay or funding 
based on ‘merit’ (Koedel, 2009; Rockoff, 2003); b) earned autonomy (Morgan, 2009; Schildkamp, 
Poortman & Handelzalts, 2016; Wößman, 2003); c) threats of sanctions (Firestone, Mayrowetz & 
Fairman, 1998; Mintrop, 2003); and d) increased scrutiny or the provision of support (Møller, 2008; 
Stoilescu, McDougall & Egodawatte, 2016; Weinbaum, 2009).  
 This paper sets out to examine the effectiveness of policy incentives in the context of 
Canadian schools and gauge both the level and type of instructional changes teachers make in 
response to LSA policies. Canadian policy incentives are quite different and far less punitive than 
many other jurisdictions (namely the more sanction-driven models in the US and UK). Canada also 
does not have anywhere near the kind of private or charter school penetration seen in some other 
nations, so that public school policies can make a large impact. Using mixed methods (survey data 
and follow-up interviews) the author examined several incentives variables to determine which have 
the most statistically significant impact on teacher decisions regarding instruction. The findings 
indicate that high-stakes assessments do have a significant correlation to instructional change 
including aspects of both teaching to the test (TTT) as well as teaching (to) the curriculum (TTC). 
This correlation can be seen as a rationale for the use of policy incentives. It should be noted, 
however, that teaching to the test will be discussed as neither an educationally defensible practice nor 
a stated policy goal. The statement that ‘incentives work’ does not fully capture the nature of these 
impacts. 
 This paper will be laid out in the following way: a) the current literature on the use of policy 
incentives will be elaborated; b) the research questions will be presented; c) the theoretical model of 
reactivity will be explained; d) the Canadian context of this study will be explored; e) the methods 
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used will be examined; f) the limitations of the study will be enumerated; g) the results from 
qualitative and quantitative data gathering will be detailed; h) a discussion of the policy implications 
of these findings will be identified; and i) the paper will be summarized in the conclusion. 
 
Literature Review 
 
 Large-scale assessment has been a fundamental tool for the purposes of educational 
accountability for decades in some jurisdictions and for at least 10 years across all provinces in 
Canada (Klinger, DeLuca & Miller, 2008). Canadian ministries have set out several specific and wide-
ranging goals for these assessments (see figure 3 below). Such large-scale policies and policy goals are 
intended to be explicit and clear to teachers (Huber & Skedsmo, 2016; Linn, 2003). Yet having more 
policy goals for such assessments makes the administration of LSAs more problematic and complex. 
Classroom-level changes require disaggregated census-style tests while policy-level goals could use 
less onerous sample-style assessments much like the Pan-Canadian Assessment Program and the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (Hargreaves & Shirley, 2011; Morris, 2011; 
Volante & Ben Jafaar, 2008). 
Unintended Consequences 
 LSA policies that promote the use of the results data must also take into consideration the 
instructional methods used to fulfill those expectations. Choices made about item-types and content 
influence teacher choices and in some cases come to supersede the full and expansive curriculum 
(Koretz, 2009; Luna & Turner, 2001; Shepard, 2000). The issue of curriculum narrowing is well 
documented and is generally considered to expend too much time and other resources on a limited 
scope of tested material (Holcombe, Jennings & Koretz, 2013; Volante, 2004). Limiting the manner 
in which students are allowed to demonstrate mastery of given outcomes is not considered the best 
classroom practice, but it is a key feature of standardized LSAs adopted by teachers to prepare their 
students (Bauer, 2000; Cizek, 2000; Datnow, Park & Kennedy-Lewis, 2012). 
 There are other unintended consequences of LSA. For example, when social actors are aware 
of the metrics that have been devised to monitor their behaviour, they react in predictable ways to 
have the results show them in the best possible light (Abrams, 2004; Olah, Lawrence & Riggins, 
2010; Webb, 2006). This is defined in this paper as ‘reactivity’ which is outlined in the theoretical 
framework section below. In short, the more importance that is applied to a given metric, the more 
likely it is that reactive behaviours will be apparent. The focus of this paper is incentives, which act to 
increase the relative import of LSAs when pressure, stakes, or sanctions are conditional upon results 
scores (Altrichter & Kemethofer, 2015; Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Hamilton & Berends, 2006).  
High Stakes 
 Concerns about how teachers will use these data are particularly acute in cases where high-
stakes testing occurs. Stakes are almost always evident to the students who must take these 
assessments, but this paper examines the considerable policy-related and public pressure on teachers 
(Spillane et al., 2002; Wößmann, 2003; Young, 2006). These professionals bear much of the blame 
when results are below expectations, and have justified concerns in some cases about professional 
consequences (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Ben Jaafar & Earl, 2008). While not all provinces has LSAs 
that are high-stakes (for example only Ontario and New Brunswick have graduation requirement 
tests), many teachers across Canada feel the stakes involved are high as is the pressure applied to 
improve instruction. On the other hand, the vocal support for high-stakes testing comes from 
researchers who assert LSA can: ensure learning is taking place: hold schools and teachers 
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accountable for their work; and to level the playing field for teachers in any one jurisdiction (Allan, 
2002; Bishop & Wößmann, 2004; Finnigan & Gross, 2007; Marsh, Farrell, & Bertrand, 2014; Wiliam, 
2010). 
 
Improving Instruction 
 
 All provincial ministries promote the use of LSA data to guide decision making. In general 
terms, the use of data to inform school-based or classroom decisions is known as data-driven 
decision making (DDDM). Making appropriate use of organized and meaningfully collected 
information, both qualitative and quantitative, helps to ‘guide decisions’ in schools (Schildkamp, 
Poortman & Handelzalts, 2016) and goes hand in glove with accountability policy. It is only 
reasonable to expect that data from LSAs are put to some constructive use. Datnow, Park and 
Kennedy-Lewis (2012) point out that being driven by data does not fix all in the education system, 
nor does simply accessing data change instructional practices for the better. Goertz, Oláh and Riggan 
(2009) support this thesis, stating that assessment literacy and professional development are 
necessary to make effective use of these data. An expansive perspective on DDDM is shown in 
Mandinach and Gummer (2016) who noted 53 skills and sources of knowledge required by teachers 
to effectively and appropriately use data. A summary perspective is given in Hamilton et al. (2009) in 
which focused on five research-approved instructional DDDM practices.  
Other Testing Models 
 Different models of test-based accountability policies have been proposed, employed and 
studied. Nichols and Harris (2016) point out that lower-stakes testing (Australia), using sample-style 
assessments (Finland); and relying on experts via school inspections (New Zealand) are all reasonable 
alternatives to high-stakes, sanctions-driven policies. Altrichter and Kemethofer (2015) examined the 
school-inspection model in Europe and found both some positive and also some questionable 
reactivity effects. This was also true of Ehren and Shackleton’s (2016) examination of the Dutch 
inspectorate. Even the Canadian and Australian ‘low-stakes’ models suffer from extreme public 
pressures after media reports of LSA data. Publication, ranking schools and the desire of teachers to 
appear effective tend to increase the stakes for teachers involved in testing. High-stakes leads to 
more well-documented unintended consequences of LSAs, namely political pressure for educational 
reform and the risks of teachers using gaming behaviours (Breakspear, 2012; Nichols & Harris, 2016; 
Rutkowski & Rutkowski, 2016). 
 In the end, this study sets out to focus on the provincial policy incentives which drive teacher 
behaviours in Canada. It is clear that policy choices can effect DDDM practices, although what 
drives data use may be teacher attitudes, appropriate and available support, or policy incentives. An 
extensive amount of research and examination of policies has been done with regards to individual 
schools, school divisions or provinces (Ben Jaafar & Earl, 2008; Campbell & Levin, 2009; Fullan, 
2009; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2011; Levin, Glaze & Fullan, 2008; Scott, Webber, Aitken & Lupart, 
2011; Volante & Cherubini, 2010; Wideman, 2002). The research study upon which this paper is 
based (Copp, 2015) was the first on the implications of LSA policy on a national scale ever done. 
This paper is one of several published and awaiting peer-review on different aspects of LSA policy. 
 
Research Questions 
 
 This study asks how and why teachers change their instructional methods in reaction to LSA 
results and more specifically about the policy incentives intended to promote these changes. The 
research questions addressed here are: 
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1) Are policy incentives regarding LSA correlated to instructional change in classrooms? 
2) Which incentives variables are most closely correlated with the instructional use of  
LSA data? 
3) Are classroom-based instructional changes more strongly correlated with teaching 
(to) the curriculum or towards teaching to the test? 
 
Instructional change made in reaction to LSA data is the dependent variable of this study. It had to 
first be established that teachers do indeed ‘react’ in some way to LSA results in order to move on to 
the more detailed questions about which incentives promote change, and what kinds of changes are 
made in practice. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 Reactivity explains the noticeable changes in behaviour when people know they are being 
externally observed or evaluated. Whether conscious or unconscious, reactivity has a direct impact 
on the objectivity of the metrics used. The concept was first examined in detail by Campbell (1957) 
as one possible design flaw in social sciences experimental methodology. In the context of this paper, 
it is hypothesized that teachers are reactive to LSAs at least in part because of the incentives written 
into related policies. The reactivity framework was chosen to provide this practical perspective on 
policy incentives. 
 Reactivity studies since Campbell’s time have looked at different fields of and found the same 
general flaw in external assessment methods: that many people are clever enough to figure out how 
they are being evaluated and find ways to ‘game’ the results. Espeland and Sauder (2007) examined 
US law schools and how they were reactive to ranking tables from US News & World Report. Public 
service performance targets can also lead to gaming behaviours, as examined by Hood (2006) in the 
UK. Manipulation of metrics is ‘the performance paradox’ explained by Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) 
or the ‘choreographed performances’ noted by Webb (2006). Whatever term is used, they are known 
to create distortions of reality when the performance metrics are known.  
 In this study, teachers were asked to respond to questions about which kinds of instructional 
changes were made in their classrooms in response to LSA results. They were presented 10 
instructional strategies and asked to indicate the frequency of their use from the choices ‘always’, 
‘sometimes’ or ‘never’. A key feature of this unique model was the differentiation of these 10 
strategies into two groupings based on their educational defensibility and related alignment with 
stated policy goals. Figure 1 shows the grouped survey prompts. 
There are five strategies that closely adhere to the professional standards set out in (for 
example) the Saskatchewan Teachers’ Federation (2015) document called their Code of 
Professional Conduct as well as stated ministry policy goals. These are designated as teaching 
(to) the curriculum (TTC). TTC includes only those practices which are considered to be both 
ethical and increase the number or variety of outcomes taught to students. These approaches are 
less likely to result in higher scores on any specific test, but they should provide the skills to 
improve achievement in different situations by avoiding the potential pitfalls of teaching geared 
to a single instrument (Popham, 2001).  
Teaching to the test (TTT) includes those educational strategies which are considered to 
be are either unethical or decrease the number or variety of outcomes taught to students. TTT 
methods are the most direct way to improve scores on a specific test, but even those practices 
which might be ethical in this grouping do not have the transferability, the increased 'leverage,' 
upon which TTC strategies are based (Au, 2007; Cullen & Reback, 2006; Jacob, 2002; Van Theil 
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& Leeuw, 2002). These strategies do not meet the terms of the Saskatchewan Teachers’ 
Federation (STF) code of conduct, especially when used to excess or by default. They also do 
not align well with the ministry goals as set out in policy documents (Copp, 2016b). The 
dependent variable of this study is the instructional change teachers make in reaction to LSA 
data. The use of either TTC or TTT strategies qualifies in this regard. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Reactivity prompts from the data gathering survey. 2 
 
The distinction made between TTC and TTT strategies was based on the judgment of the 
author, the terms of the STF code of conduct, as well as the education ministries ’ policy goals. 
These three considerations showed great congruence in the selection of the groups. There is a 
distinction made in the literature about types of reactivity, and it seemed only appropriate to 
treat TTC and TTT as substantially different reactions to LSA data (Koretz, 2009). It is 
important to note that it not being argued that the use of these strategies in specific cases is 
necessarily unethical. Teachers suit their instructional methods to student needs and make 
choices about what will work best throughout the school year, and this is just as it should be. 
What is suggested by the author is that the use of TTT strategies when used by  default, 
regularity, or with entire class groups is less appropriate than using TTC strategies. The 
difference between the groups is one based on judgement and was not determined or expected 
to be shown with statistical methods. It is understood that some readers will disagree. 
 
Canadian Context 
 
In Canada each province has jurisdiction over education policy including which subject 
areas and grade levels are assessed using LSAs. Figure 2 shows the information gathered from 
provincial ministry websites (in 2015). It indicates that grades 3, 6, 9 and 12 have the most 
testing, but subjects, methods, and relative stakes for students and teachers differ.  The policies 
also differ in terms of incentives for improvement. In each province, the results are made public 
either through an education ministry release and/or publishing in newspapers and other media. 
                                                 
2 Adapted from Copp, 2016a, p. 7. 
Teaching (to) the Curriculum Teaching to the Test
I have looked for Professional Development to 
improve my instructional practices.
I cover material I know will be on the test very well.
I have requested additional resources related to 
testing.
I focus more on test-taking strategies like the 
process of elimination.
I have worked with other teachers to make sense of 
the data.
I use the format of the test to give similar types of 
practice questions.
I cover a wider range of topics in the curriculum. I focus more on subjects that have provincial tests.
I hold group study sessions or provide extra help 
after school.
I review old exam questions.
Q: Think about the ways your instruction may have changed in classes which write provincial 
assessments as compared to those classes that do not write these tests. Choose a response for all the 
following statements: (Response choices for each statement were: not at all; somewhat; a great deal.) 
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Policy-level choices made based on the results vary from staying the course, tweaking tests or 
test design, monetary support for new programs, all the way to the complete overhaul of school 
curricula. In many provinces, the test items are a closely guarded secret so as to avoid the risk of 
teachers giving students more information than they need. In these provinces teachers do not 
even see the tests until the day of the assessment (Prince Edward Island and Alberta are 
examples). Other jurisdictions freely distribute the tests and even suggest running through 
practice tests (Ontario and Saskatchwan are examples). There has been a furor in the press in 
Ontario recently about the fact that education funding has increased but provincial  math 
assessment (EQAO) scores are going down (Maharaj, 2017). The controversy and scrutiny over 
scores from LSA results do have a significant policy impact. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Subjects and grade levels assessed in Canadian provinces.3 
Note: Short forms for the provinces: Alberta (AB); British Colombia (BC); Manitoba (MB); New Brunswick (NB); 
Newfoundland and Labrador (NL); Nova Scotia (NS); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (PEI; Quebec (QC) 
and Saskatchewan (SK). 
 
 
The assessed subjects always include English or French, mathematics, and regularly 
science and social studies. Other subject assessments are administered only in British Columbia, 
and these will be discontinued in the 2016-2017 school year. There is great variation seen in the 
kinds of tests given to students, and what stakes are applied to teachers. Certainly there is no talk 
in Canada of firing teachers or principals, or of shutting schools as a result of poor LSA results.  
There is pressure to improve applied in each province, although the type of test somewhat 
dictates the kind of pressure. Public and parent scrutiny is likely the most cited by interview 
respondents, especially when tests are a graduation requirement or when the grades are 
significant factors for university admission and scholarship opportunities (more on this topic 
follows). 
                                                 
3 Adapted from Copp, 2016b, p. 6. 
AB BC MB NB NL NS ON PEI QC SK
Gr. 1 EF,M 5
Gr. 2 EF EF,M 5
Gr. 3 EF,M EF,M M EF,M EF EF,M EF,M EF,M 5
Gr. 4 EF,M EF M F EF 7
Gr. 5 EF,M M 7
Gr. 6 EF,M,S,SS EF,M EF,M EF,M EF,M EF,M 
Gr. 7 EF,M M EF EF 7
Gr. 8 EF M EF,M M 7
Gr. 9 EF,M,S,SS EF 1 EF,M M EF,M 
Gr. 10 EF,M EF 1 M,SS,S 1
Gr. 11 EF 4 EF 4 EF EF 7
Gr. 12 EF,M,S,SS3,6 EF,O 3 EF,M 3 EF 3 EF,M,S,SS 3 EF,S,M 2
1 - Graduation requirement (must be passed) EF - Core Engl ish or French
2 - Graduation requirement only when teacher not accredited M - Mathematics
3 - Mark on exam ass igned a  des ignated va lue of fina l  grade S - Science
4 - Re-write of graduation requirement exam SS - Socia l  Studies
5 - Pi loting in the 2013-2014 school  year O - Other
6 - Student must wri te both EF and SS
7 - Suspended s ince the 2012-2013 school  year
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Figure 3 shows the numerous policy goals set by the 10 provincial education ministries in 
Canada. These goals are intended to be addressed by the administration and analysis of LSAs.  
There is a clear tendency to include both policy-level and cassroom-level goals for these 
assessments. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Stated policy purposes of LSAs in Canadian provinces.4     
Note: Short forms are used for the provinces: Alberta (AB); British Colombia (BC); Manitoba (MB); New Brunswick 
(NB); Newfoundland and Labrador (NL); Nova Scotia (NS); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (PEI; Quebec (QC) 
and Saskatchewan (SK). 
 
Methodology 
 
Mixed methods are used in this study to identify both statistical correlations and also to 
expose explanatory details from interviews (Flick, 2006). This study employed a sequential 
explanatory design with a survey as the primary data collection, followed by the second phase 
interviews, which were analyzed in terms of the established frames from the quantitative analyses 
(Blaikie, 2000).     
 
Surveys 
 
Surveys were emailed to participating schools in all Canadian provinces and to teachers at all 
grade levels Pre-K through 12.  A review of the literature revealed useful field-tested questions from 
relevant research studies including from Skwarchuk (2004), Hamilton and Berends (2006), Brown 
(2004), Wayman, Cho, Jimerson and Spikes (2012), Boyle, Lamprianou and Boyle (2005). Questions 
from these studies were adapted to meet the needs of this study. There were several themes from the 
literature examined: test design and data; teacher attitudes; supports for data use; and policy 
                                                 
4 Adapted fromCopp, 2016b, p. 7. 
Purposes of large-scale provincial assessment AB BC MB NB NL NS ON PEI QC SK
  Reporting/accountability  X * X X X X X X *
Requirement for graduation  † † † † † ‡
Reference to PISA, PCAP, PIRLS, TIMMS  X X X X X X X X X X
Monitoring/improving student achievement  X X X X X X X X X *
Improve central data-based decision-making  * X X X * X *
Adherence to curriculum  X X X X X X X
Interventions for struggling students  X X X X X X X *
Improve local data-based decision-making  * X X X X X *
PD/assessment literacy of educators  X X X *
Total number of stated/implied purposes  6 8 6 8 6 8 9 5 8 7
X    Purpose evident from ministry literature
*    Not explicitly stated, but apparent from ministry literature
†    Exams must be written but need not have a passing grade
‡    Exams are mandatory when teachers are not accredited
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incentives. Each of these is treated separately in one paper in a series from the author (Copp, 2016a, 
2016b, 2017). The complete survey is shown in Appendix 2 alongside the values assigned to different 
responses for analysis. 
All surveys were sent in the 2013-2014 school year in a cross-sectional design. The sampling 
unit was individual teachers, Canadian public school teachers who administer LSAs were the target 
population, and the probability sampling was clustered in school divisions. School divisions provided 
non-overlapping geographical areas of study. The selection of participants was random, yet it was 
subject to the reality that many school divisions chose not to take part making this as much a 
voluntary sample (at the division level) as a random one.  
While the target population included several strata, there is a lack of demographic data 
available about teachers at both the national and the provincial level. Statistics Canada collects 
national data on only two of these strata (sex and age). National sample age data are 92.6% 
congruent with Statistics Canada (2007) numbers and sex data are 99.4% congruent. This level of 
comparability, even if for a limited number of comparators make it more likely that these results 
could be generalized to the wider Canadian teaching population (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). 
Single province samples were too small for anything more than summary analyses, but the larger 'n' 
of the nation-wide data meant that all strata were well represented.  
 
Table 1 
Response rates for the teacher survey5 
 
 
All teachers in a given school had the opportunity to respond (n=1071) but the data and 
analysis here come from the subset of teachers (n=453) who administer LSAs in their classrooms. 
The minimum number of respondents in this group from each province was set at 30. The overall 
response rate was only moderate overall (Nardi, 2006). It is uncertain, though, whether simple non-
response itself casts doubt on the results of any reasonably responded-to instrument as nonresponse 
bias is a function of both the rate of response and the difference between responses for these two 
groups (Couper, 2000; Olsen, 2006). Response rates for the survey are given in Table 1. 
The dependent variable from the larger study was teacher reactivity, of both TTT and TTC 
types. Other grouped variables examined were tests and test design; teacher attitudes about testing; 
supports to use data; and incentive to use data. Table 2 gives the average scores and standard errors 
                                                 
5 Adapted from Copp, 2016a, p. 9. 
Prov.
Number of                    
participant 
divisions
Number of                   
participant schools
Participant 
schools'                 
FTEs
Teachers who 
may            give 
LSAs
Responses from         
teachers giving 
LSAs
Response rate
AB 4 18 561.4 187 48 25.6%
BC 4 32 808.9 202 43 21.3%
MB 7 29 669.2 221 40 18.1%
NB 2 18 649.2 378 59 15.6%
NL 1 13 313.9 104 30 28.8%
NS 2 23 335.1 139 61 43.8%
ON 7 25 630.9 208 52 25.0%
PEI 1 28 568.4 142 35 24.6%
QC 3 13 302.6 76 30 39.5%
SK 4 40 683.7 171 55 32.2%
CANADA 27 181 5523.1 1963 453 23.1%
Note: FTEs are full-time equivalences; 1.0 is one full-time teacher. Short forms for the provinces: Alberta (AB); British Colombia (BC); Manitoba (MB); New Brunswick 
(NB); Newfoundland and Labrador (NL); Nova Scotia (NS); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (PEI; Quebec (QC) and Saskatchewan (SK).
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from the survey reactivity questions. As a result if the low numbers of respondents in some 
provinces, the rankings should be considered cautiously. Table 3 shows the results from regressions 
using these grouped variables. Background information about the respondent teachers were also 
collected and analyzed. The only data closely examined in this paper are those related to reactivity 
and incentives (the full survey is in Appendix 2). 
The quantitative analyses are built around a conception of the dependent variable (Y) in this 
study (Diez, Barr & Cetinkaya-Rundel, 2016): 
 
Yi = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + . . . + βkXki + ei i = 1, , , , , n   (1) 
  
Yi represents the dependent variable or reactivity level for teacher i (use of test data); X1i is the first 
independent variable, X2i is the second, etc. These are explanatory variables for the teacher i (all of 
the several incentives variables are named in Table 3); Intercept β0 is the expected value of Y when all 
Xs equal 0; β1 is the regression coefficient of X1; β2 is the regression coefficient of X2, . . ., βk ; and ei is 
the residual of the regression. 
The survey data were operationalized by assigning values to responses. Any practice or policy 
that seemed to promote or make easier teachers using LSA data was assigned a positive value. A 
practice or policy that was thought to make using these data more difficult was assigned a negative 
value (shown in Appendix 2). For reactivity variables, a similar process was used. Three choices were 
presented to respondents about the frequency of using specific strategies as a result of LSA data. 
Responses of ‘always’ were scored ±1, ‘sometimes’ was scored ±0.5, and ‘never’ was scored as 0 
(TTT responses received negative values). These values are shown in alongside the survey in 
Appendix 2. 
Each of the four lines of inquiry consisted of several survey questions which were aggregated 
for the preliminary analysis seen in Table 3. Each of the four aggregated scales were given equal 
weight in this regression in order to see which lines of inquiry had the most statistical impact on 
respondents’ use of data. 
Within each of the groupings, the questions asked were analyzed to see which of the 
independent variables had the greatest statistical impact in the use of LSA data to improve 
instructional practices (Table 4). Incentives variables are the main focus of this paper. Five questions 
were asked about incentives: i. Which jurisdiction (the school, school division, or provincial ministry, 
or none) had expectations that the data be used to improve instruction; 2. Which jurisdiction 
followed up on how LSA data were used in the classroom to improve instruction (the school, school 
division, or provincial ministry, or none); 3. Perceived pressure from LSAs was rated between the 
choices ‘none’, ‘low’ and ‘high.’ 4. Perceived stakes for the LSAs were rated on the same scale. 5. 
Respondents were rated on their awareness of results by answering whether their class, school or 
school division results were higher than average, lower than average, or average. The other options 
were ‘I don’t recall’ or ‘the results were not provided.’  
Spearman's rank order correlation tests were done for these items (and items for all other 
lines of inquiry) to verify the validity of these numerical scales. Significant correlations between the 
independent variables indicated that the scales aligned, that many of the variables were relevant, and 
that values had been ascribed properly. The Spearman’s correlations proved to be both significant 
and positive, but no distortion from multicollinearity was noted (Appendix, figure A1). 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to verify the internal consistency of scale variables in this 
table and in the analyses that follow. The alpha is often used as an index of reliability to check that 
items appear to measure the underlying construct (Jimerson, 2016; Santos, 1999). All reactivity scale 
items had alpha scores over 0.70 or more and the scale alpha was 0.742 indicating adequate 
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congruence of the items in the aggregated score. For the incentives scale, the alpha was 0.731 while 
the lowest item score was 0.649 (Appendix, figures A2 and A3). Figures for these and other statistical 
analyses are found in Appendix 1. Alpha values are subject to interpretation which is best left to the 
reader, noting that both scales have good consistency across items (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). 
 
Interviews 
 
The interview data collection used a semi-structured format to follow up upon the themes 
from the survey instrument. This was in order to triangulate the qualitative and quantitative data 
(Hamilton et al., 2009; Jick, 1979). While interviews were done to explore the lines of inquiry in more 
depth, contradictory data were also unearthed. Knowing there is a wide range of opinion on the 
topic of LSA, the data sets are complementary in the sense that only through the exploration 
qualitative data can one hope to fully explain relationships found using quantitative methods 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). 
Subjects for interviews were purposively selected to represent the instructional strategies self-
reported by teachers (Flick, 2006). Selection was based on a stratified sampling at the high and low 
ends of the reactivity range (those teachers with high scores for TTC and also those with high scores 
for TTT were contacted). The sample was multilevel since it also included in-school and division-
level administrators (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). Only classroom teachers had completed the 
survey, but these in-school and division-level staff were interviewed in order to compare their 
responses to those of teachers.   
The interview sample included teachers and administrators from across Canada and was 
made up of 13 classroom teachers, 10 in-school administrators, and four division-level staff. 
Respondents from such a small sample could not be expected to be representative of the survey 
population or to meet an external validity standard. They were chosen purposively to provide extra 
insight into the quantitative results (Flick, 2006). Interview data were not collected for generalization 
but rather to elaborate on specific topics. 
 
Limitations 
 
The data set from the survey was extensive but lacked some variability in locations where 
many schools and/or school divisions chose not to participate. The data were collected under strict 
confidentiality which meant the exclusion of school identifiers which might have made possible 
analysis using hierarchical linear modeling methods. HLM methods would be well suited to these 
data if the author had collected identifiers, and as a result these findings may be seen as less accurate. 
The response rate for the survey was reasonable but not high enough to dismiss the concern of 
nonresponse bias. While survey items were drawn from peer-reviewed and influential education 
studies, this is no guarantee of the construct validity. The interviews provided valuable insights into 
both policy and instructional choices, but were drawn from a small sample, and thus have their value 
limited to the insight they provide in conjunction with the survey data analysis.  
 
Findings 
 
Four Lines of Inquiry 
 
The independent variables used in the survey were identified initially from the literature on 
large-scale assessment and included four main lines of inquiry operationalized for quantitative 
analysis purposes: (1) test data and design; (2) supports provided for teachers; (3) incentives for 
teachers to use these data; and (4) teachers' attitudes regarding the large-scale assessment. The first 
category asked about the types of items on the LSA, and how the data were returned to teachers. The 
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supports category asked what type and number of supports were made available to teachers. The 
third grouped variable consisted of questions about incentives which are seen below in Table 4. The 
attitudes variable asked teachers’ opinions on how they thought the data might best be used. The 
complete survey is found in Appendix 2 and makes clear the categorized variable groupings. 
Table 3 presents the lines of inquiry with beta (standardized) coefficients in order to show 
the relative strength of scale variables in an unbiased comparison. Coefficients are from multivariate 
regressions for the nationwide dataset, which allows one to see which scale variables had the most 
significant effects on different types of reactivity. For detailed analysis of lines of inquiry other than 
incentives, see Copp (2016a, 2016b, 2017). 
 
Table 2 
Reactivity scores categorized into TTC, TTT and net effects6 
 
Note: TTT scores are negatively valued. Short forms are used for the provinces: Alberta (AB); British Colombia (BC); 
Manitoba (MB); New Brunswick (NB); Newfoundland and Labrador (NL); Nova Scotia (NS); Ontario (ON); Prince 
Edward Island (PEI; Quebec (QC) and Saskatchewan (SK). 
 
 
The variables with the greatest correlation with TTC, based on beta scores, are the attitudes 
variables (Copp, 2016a). They have no significant impact on TTT effects. Similarly, supports 
variables have a significant correlation with TTC but none on TTT (Copp, 2016c). Tests and data 
variables have no significant impacts on either TTC or TTT. Most relevant to this paper, though, are 
incentives variables which have a uniquely significant impact on both TTC and TTT. With three 
significant scale variables in play, the amount of variance in TTC explained by these lines of inquiry 
is a relatively high 20%. With only one significant scale variable working on TTT effects, the adjusted 
R2 value falls to only 3%. It can be seen that incentives variables are significant in their correlation to 
LSA-based instructional change. 
 
Incentives Variables 
 
                                                 
6 Adapted from Copp, 2016b, p. 11. 
Prov. Avg. score SD Prov. Avg. score SD Prov. Avg. score SD
Rank Prov. n
1st AB 2.99 1.08 ON -3.73 1.17 NS 0.29 1.40 AB 46
2nd NB 2.92 1.05 QC -3.54 1.11 PEI -0.07 1.14 BC 39
3rd QC 2.84 1.16 NL -3.53 0.80 SK -0.26 1.17 MB 37
4th PEI 2.82 1.08 AB -3.53 1.15 NB -0.32 1.20 NB 55
5th NL 2.72 0.90 NB -3.28 1.03 MB -0.38 1.38 NL 29
6th NS 2.52 1.11 BC -3.13 1.21 AB -0.49 1.36 NS 48
7th MB 2.37 1.17 PEI -2.90 1.03 QC -0.70 1.37 ON 51
8th ON 2.26 1.25 MB -2.74 1.28 NL -0.81 1.28 PEI 34
9th SK 2.21 1.17 SK -2.43 1.17 BC -1.31 1.16 QC 29
10th BC 1.83 0.95 NS -2.21 1.31 ON -1.46 1.30 SK 50
Canada 2.50 1.15 -3.09 1.24 -0.56 1.37 418
TTC TTT Net Reactivity
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There were five independent variables under the grouping ‘incentives’ examined in this study. 
The most significant of these (as seen in Table 4) was ‘perceived pressure.’ It shows highly significant 
correlations with both TTC and TTT effects before and after the addition of provincial dummy 
variables (these being included to account somewhat for variations between testing programs in 
different jurisdictions). Perceived pressure was also the only variable that proved significant at all on 
the TTT side of the table after provincial dummies were included in the regression model.  
 
Table 3 
Four lines of inquiry from the survey correlated with instructional changes (TTC and TTT).7  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Adapted from Copp, 2016a, p. 12. 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Tests and data 0.00 0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Supports 0.014** 0.0124* 0.009 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Incentives 0.083*** 0.083*** -0.073** -0.063** 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Attitudes 0.015** 0.013** -0.002 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Provincial AB 0.109 AB 0.283
dummies (0.299) (0.397)
BC -0.074 MB -0.455
(0.381) (0.421)
NB 0.048 NB 0.397
(0.295) (0.402)
NL 0.088 NL -0.128
(0.341) (0.440)
NS -0.298 NS 1.460** 
(0.310) (0.402)
ON -0.004 ON 0.718
(0.307) (0.413)
PEI -0.702 PEI 0.069
(0.301) (0.395)
QC 0.018 QC -0.052
(0.322) (0.430)
SK -0.629 SK 1.099*
(0.355) (0.456)
Constant 0.974**         1.147** -3.232*** -3.670***
(0.345)         (0.425) (0.395) (0.454)
N 228 228 230 230
Adj. R
2
0.199 0.231 0.033 0.148
TTC TTT
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Note: SE in parentheses; * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001; TTT effects are negatively valued. Short forms are used for 
the provinces: Alberta (AB); British Colombia (BC); Manitoba (MB); New Brunswick (NB); Newfoundland and Labrador 
(NL); Nova Scotia (NS); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (PEI; Quebec (QC) and Saskatchewan (SK). 
 
 
Table 4 
Incentives variables correlated with the use of data to inform instructional changes (TTC and TTT) 
 
β β
Expectation to use data 0.062 0.032 0.043 0.056 0.012 0.015
(0.044)  (0.047) (0.050) (0.052)
Follow up on data use 0.120* 0.127* 0.137 -0.002 0.019 0.019
(0.053) (0.053) (0.061) (0.059)
Results-awareness 0.039 0.044 0.081 -0.070* -0.044 -0.076
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.031)
Perceived pressure 0.778*** 0.764*** 0.22 -0.787*** -0.652** -0.177
(0.195) (0.194) (0.220) (0.214)
Perceived stakes 0.356* 0.374* 0.118 -0.207 -0.019 -0.006
(0.173) (0.173) (0.196) (0.191)
AB 0.290 AB -0.271
(0.255) (0.278)
BC -0.456 MB 0.304
(0.258) (0.281)
NB 0.094 NB 0.058
(0.254) (0.278)
NL -0.024 NL -0.225
(0.289) (0.314)
NS 0.061 NS 0.978***
(0.263) (0.285)
ON -0.010 ON 0.457
(0.275) (0.299)
PEI -0.592* PEI -0.310
(0.256) (0.281)
QC 0.093 QC -0.235
(0.279) (0.303)
SK -0.490 SK 0.676*
(0.304) (.0334)
Constant 1.755*** 1.870*** -2.511*** -2.795***
(0.131) (0.209) (0.146) (0.232)
N 343 343 344 344
Adjusted R
2
0.163 0.205 0.061 0.147
Short forms for provinces: Alberta (AB); British Colombia (BC); Manitoba (MB); New Brunswick (NB); Newfoundland
and Labrador (NL); Nova Scotia (NS); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (PEI; Quebec (QC) and Saskatchewan (SK).
Note:  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001; β (beta) scores show standardized values; TTT ef f ects are negatively valued.
TTC
Coefficient         SE
TTT
Coefficient       SE
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The other variables that indicated significant results were ‘follow up data use’ and ‘perceived stakes’ 
these having significant correlations with only TTC effects. Each of these variables will be 
considered in turn alongside qualitative (interview) data used to either support or challenge the 
statistical correlations shown here. 
 
Perceived pressure. The perceived pressure variable was highly significant in terms of TTC 
and TTT effects on teachers. There is evidence here to support the idea that incentives used to 
increase the pressure on teachers to use LSA data are quite effective at this task. It is less encouraging 
that perceived pressure does not significantly increase the chances that teachers are using the data in 
the manner expected by provincial education ministries or the STF Code of Professional Conduct 
(2015). Incentives that increase pressure on teachers increase both TTT and TTC effects, and make 
less certain the educational effectiveness of the instructional changes to which their application and 
implementation appears to contribute (Appendix, figure A8).  
Interview respondents frequently commented on the high levels of pressure teachers felt 
when teaching classes that administered LSAs. 
As an administrator I try to assure them [teachers] that this is part of your teaching, 
this is all doing the things you do normally. I still think there is a stress there, that 
their kids, if their kids haven't met the standards there is obviously a stress there that 
they are not doing their job. (MB, Elementary school principal, female) 
 
We talk about the journey being a 10 year journey and so if you’re missing some 
essential foundational learnings, and umm, then you have a Math assessment at the 
end of grade 9 and you haven't really achieved, I think our grade 9 teacher feels like, 
you know, a lot of pressure for her… We keep trying to remind her that they didn't 
‘not learn it’ over one year, they ‘not learned it’ over a number of years. (PEI, K-9 
school principal, female) 
 
And that's the unfortunate side-effect of a test culture, right? Like if you put all of 
the worth on the test, then of course your energies are going to be focused on the 
test which is not where there should be focused. (AB, High school Math teacher, 
female)  
 
It was true that the source of the pressure was sometimes attributed to the public pressure for 
accountability made explicit through the publication of assessment results and implicit expectations 
from school or senior administration to perform well. More commonly, though, respondents spoke 
about professional responsibility being a source of pressure. 
A teacher is a teacher because of their intrinsic drive. I don't think they need any 
external forces pushing them to be better. (NB, Middle years homeroom teacher, 
female) 
 
You know I feel under a lot of pressure, but you know, it's self-induced, really, to 
make sure they do well, and the students are under that same pressure… You see 
across the hallway there are students over there that do course that don't have 
provincial exams and they seem to really be enjoying their courses… But in my room, 
you know, I don't want anyone knocking on the door from 9:00 until 10:00 - we’re 
doing problems and nobody moves. (NL, High school Science teacher, male) 
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It was difficult in most cases to fault the teachers for their conduct knowing that the accountability 
systems in which they acted were not of their creation and were not designed according to their 
wishes. The understanding of this reality was especially clear in the minds of division-level 
administrators. 
It makes up such big part of kids’ marks that in lots of ways it determines the kids’ 
marks and those marks are, for most kids, only relevant when it comes to applying for 
post-secondary and applying for scholarships. And then you are looking at this kid 
gets in because they have and 86 and this kid doesn't because they have an 85. (AB, 
High school Math teacher, female) 
 
I don't think it is appropriate for a teachers to get old FSA exams and teach to that… 
Whereas when it starts counting, if you will, towards the kids' marks and their future 
and you know that this is a reality that the kids are facing I would say that it is 
appropriate, not necessarily the best educational thing ever, but it is appropriate 
because teachers are supposed to help kids. (BC, Division staff, male) 
 
And I think [LSAs] do provide unnecessary pressure on teachers and I think they are 
misrepresented definitely in the media. And so, of course, people who don’t 
understand and they just hear a test score or they just see, you know, Nova Scotia's 
results in literacy and math are low, and therefore our school system is poor and our 
teachers are not teaching effectively. Well, that is just not true. (NS, Division staff, 
female) 
   
The OSSLT is distinguished from the other 3 tests, namely grade 3, grade 6, and grade 
9, because it is a graduation requirement. So, you know, it is not ethical as an educator, 
no matter where you stood on the fence with this, to not do your absolute best to 
allow students to be successful. (ON, Division staff, male) 
 
It was clear from interviews (which also proved supportive of the quantitative findings) that pressure 
was the single most important driver of teachers’ response to LSA testing and the release of results 
data. Whether internally or externally imposed, pressure caused significant stress to teachers and in 
some instances affected their choices about which grades or subjects they wanted to teach. 
 
 Follow up on data use. Following up on data use is an important aspect of policies being 
faithfully implemented (i.e. as policy makers had intended). The results from Table 2 appear to bear 
out this conclusion, yet the correlation is only weakly significant. Teachers had vastly differing 
experiences with this kind of oversight, some saying it was not evident, while others indicated that it 
was both prominent and important. The follow up that was noted by respondents came from 
different levels of administration, but school-level oversight was most frequently cited (Appendix, 
figures A5 and A6). 
It would vary widely depending on the administrative team at a given school. I have 
worked with principals for whom diploma results [LSA scores] would be ‘be-all and 
end-all’ and for whom every kid would be exempted from diploma exams if that were 
an option… it is highly inconsistent. (AB, High school Math teacher, female) 
 
The current administration is content with the fact that we are talking with each other 
and we talk to them and we discuss the concerns that we have.  Everything tends to be 
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a proactive approach. I think that’s one of the values I share with my current 
administration. (AB, High school Science teacher, male) 
 
No [division-level follow up], none. None whatsoever. We choose to do [common 
assessments] because that's the only way we can grow as a school, to monitor the 
progress of our students. And it is important for us to have that data… to try to 
become a more data-driven school and show how, ahh, how we can improve as a 
result of using the data from previous years. (NB, High school principal, male) 
 
For other schools, it was noted that the leadership to follow up on data use was not modeled 
from the division level or from the school administration. Some respondents painted the 
picture of schools and teachers sailing in a ship without a rudder in terms of data use. 
The division seems to be scattered and all over the place. . . We don't see anyone from 
the board. . . And, you can see it kind of falling away now - they don't ask us for 
reports anymore, 'Yeah, go ahead and do that…" (NL, High school Science teacher, 
male) 
 
Well, I know as an administrator you're certainly in and checking and following along 
with what [teachers] should be doing, but I don't know there would be necessarily a 
prescription for a specific teacher to follow this type of direction. And I would not be 
made aware of it from a board or department level that, 'Mr. Smith needs to improve 
on this portion of his lesson and it is important for you… to go in and watch and see 
that this is happening.' (PEI, High school Math teacher, male 
 
I don't think that expectation was ever given to us on what to do with them. It was 
sort of like, I felt like, oh, you have to give it to see where students are, and then there 
was no follow up from anyone. It was just, this is what it is… and that was it. (SK, 
Middle years homeroom teacher, female) 
 
Considering the wide range of responses regarding following up on data use it is no surprise that the 
correlation is only weakly significant. A stronger correlation to reactivity effects would be dependent 
upon both more teachers indicating that some kind of follow up on their data use practices was done 
and also upon policy documents making it very clear to school and senior administration that they 
have this particular role to play to ensure common, faithful implementation. 
 
 Perceived stakes. High stakes testing is quite different in the United States as compared to 
Canadian LSAs. The stakes in Canada are directly applied only to students, and indirectly to teachers 
and schools. The evidence on the efficacy of stakes as an incentive is inconclusive, but has been 
more closely tied to TTT effects than the TTC variety. 
Many teachers made note of the lack of professional stakes applied to teachers based on their 
students’ LSA scores (Appendix, figure A9).   
I can't recall anyone having paid a professional price for bad results. So, yes, it is high 
stakes, teachers are apprehensive, but I think that it has been enough of a routine that 
teachers manage that. (AB, High school Science teacher, male) 
 
As an administrator the conversation about, 'you need to improve those scores or else', 
kind of thing, has never happened. Yeah, we don't go that road. (MB, Elementary 
school principal, female) 
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I see the newer teachers worried like, 'Am I going to get to teach this class again?' 
Because there is still a perceived hierarchy in the courses you get to teach. (AB, High 
school Math teacher, female) 
 
It is also the case that many respondents saw the stakes they perceive which are applied from higher 
jurisdictional levels and can, for good or for ill, have an effect on their professional development 
and/or their teaching practices.  
Yeah, just from knowing [the provincial exam] is coming up, you know, even weighing 
my decision about whether or not I wanted to loop with my kids or not. I wanted to 
loop but I knew that [the exam] was at the end of the year, I was going to have to face 
that exam, those exams. (QC, Middle years homeroom teacher, female) 
 
What happens in literacy is entirely, well, not entirely, but the teacher has the plasticity 
around what happens in that time frame. The same way in their math block… It is less 
about robbing Peter to pay Paul and more about looking at much broader strokes of 
how we approach literacy and numeracy. (ON, Division staff, male) 
 
Whereas the math [assessment], yes, absolutely.  I know 100% that it is used in our 
board to compare teachers to teachers. (ON, High school English consultant, female) 
 
Some concern was raised about how the data can help create perceptions that are not entirely 
accurate. A snapshot was not seen as a very good metric for measuring teacher effectiveness. 
I have to be honest, I only look at our own school, you know. And generally I think 
we are getting better, or the marks are getting better. Whether that means [teaching is] 
getting better, I don't know. . . Sometimes I think it is just the group of kids you have. 
(PEI, Elementary homeroom teacher, female) 
 
When you are comparing from year to year and using that as data for improvement it 
is kind of like trying to judge the population trends of height, for example, by watching 
people pass by a window. A tall person passes, then a medium person passes, then a 
short person passes. If you use that process to do your data gathering, then you are 
going to conclude that people are getting shorter. (QC, High school English teacher, 
male) 
 
Since stakes for teachers are applied at much lower levels than it is in some other high stakes 
environments (many interview respondents referenced the US education system), this proved to be a 
less significant variable than the pressure which is more clearly apparent from students, parents and 
the public at large. 
  
Other variables. Some of the variables examined did not prove significant despite their 
prominence in the LSA literature. Being aware of the results of LSAs is clearly the entry point to 
using the data (Datnow, Park & Kennedy-Lewis, 2012; Wideman, 2002), but this variable did not 
prove significant for either instructional change strategy barring the weak correlation to TTT before 
the addition of provincial dummies. Teachers reported their levels of awareness were quite 
dependent on the attitudes of school and divisional leadership (Appendix, figure A7). 
Our administration is very supportive and do not use the data for anything within our 
school but provincially the data is used to rank schools in the whole province. (BC, 
Elementary homeroom teacher, female) 
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Now... all of our resources are supposed to be allocated and all of our teaching is 
supposed to be data-driven. Right? So we are all about collecting the data and we've 
got testing up the wazoo and stuff. So there is on some level, there is an expectation 
that we are trying to improve our results every year. (PEI, Elementary homeroom 
teacher, female) 
 
Another aspect of implementation literature examined in this study was the effectiveness of making 
expectations explicit and clear. Even when expectations were relayed to teachers, no correlation with 
reactivity effects appears in the quantitative data. The qualitative data indicate that teachers have very 
different experiences regarding this variable (Appendix, figure A4). 
It is district-driven. We have a school improvement plan that we have to do every year 
and basically it is instructional-based… So we do that at the beginning of the year. 
When we go in in August we're gonna talk about what are we looking at that we really 
want to focus our instruction on. So using the data, the district requires that we fill out 
an SIP. (NB, Middle years homeroom teacher, female) 
 
I think unless there is involvement of the administration in the, you know, in a literacy 
culture, in a standardized test culture in the school, all classroom teachers can close 
their doors and do whatever they want. (ON, High school English consultant, female) 
  
It appears that expectations, much like all the other variables in this section, are relayed in very 
different ways to different teachers and in some cases, they are not transmitted at all. Since policy 
expectations across Canada differ, it may be considered unfair to judge the practical effects of the 
implementation for such different LSA programs. Yet we should remember the fact that the policy 
goals of LSA are strikingly similar across all 10 provinces, and that the improvement of instruction 
(referred to in this paper as teaching [to] the curriculum) is the ultimate goal of all provincial 
education ministries. In sum, these responses show that the uneven and unclear implementation 
practices reported by interview subjects align well (triangulate) with the survey results to illuminate 
practices that: a) do not always align to stated policy goals; b) that have unintended consequences on 
instructional practices; and c) which divert the attention, financial resources and the time of 
educational professionals and leaders in this pursuit. 
 
Discussion 
 
 In an effort to both improve the academic results of students in large-scale assessments and 
to improve the quality of teaching in Canadian public schools, LSAs are used in all 10 Canadian 
provinces as a means of reaching these goals. Unfortunately LSAs have not proven to be a uniformly 
effective means of promoting positive instructional changes. This study examined the use of LSAs 
and the incentives built into assessment policies in the context of both the policy goals stated by 
provincial ministries and the instructional methods demonstrated as effective in the STF Code of 
Professional Conduct (2015). It has been seen that policy-based incentives do correlate with more 
reactivity, but it is predominantly in the form of teaching to the test, which is in line with neither 
ministry goals nor the principles of the STF Code. This being established, there are some lessons for 
policy makers to draw. 
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‘Incentives Work’ 
 
 Incentives variables do prove to be quite effective at inspiring instructional change. Of the 
scale variables examined in the larger study upon which this paper is based, the incentives scale alone 
showed highly significant results in terms of teaching (to) the curriculum effects as well as teaching 
to the test effects. Incentives are clearly very effective in terms of increasing the level of reactivity in 
teachers. Yet while TTC is the stated goal of both the provincial ministries and the STF Code, TTT 
is not, and yet it has an equally significant relationship with policy incentives. Recent research bears 
out the fact that TTT is a common and less desirable consequence of the single-minded pursuit of 
higher test scores (Hill, Mellon, Laker & Goddard, 2016). 
 So while it is seen that incentives are effective at promoting instructional change, it should be 
added that the changes which result from policy incentives do not necessarily help ministries achieve 
instructional improvement goals. Thus the use of policy-based incentives is at best a questionable 
method of trying to achieve either better teaching or better learning. 
 
High Stakes 
 
The correlation found in the literature between high stakes testing and high pressure testing 
environments is an important one to consider in this study (Finnigan & Gross, 2007; Luna & Turner, 
2001; Madaus, 1988). Of the 10 provinces in Canada, seven currently employ some form of high 
stakes exam whether it be a minimum competency exam or one that is factored into grades for 
summative purposes. Since graduation, university admissions, and scholarships all depend on these 
results, teachers feel great pressure from students, parents and administrators to produce solid 
results. There is an apparent correlation between giving these high stakes, high-pressure exams and 
greater reported reactivity effects. Table 3 lists the provinces in terms of reactivity effects.  
The three provinces which do not give high stakes high school exams are Nova Scotia, 
Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. These provinces appear near the bottom of the TTT scale 
and the middle of the TTC scale. The same group also appears near the top of the net reactivity scale 
which (by adding the positive values of TTC scores to the negative values applied to TTT) gauges 
the balance between the self-reported uses of these strategies. If LSA policies (including incentives) 
were acting as proposed, the net reactivity scale should be heavily tilted into the positive range. We 
can see that there is less reactivity generally in these three provinces, but that they have the highest 
degree of balance between TTC and TTT effects (a perfect balance would produce a net reactivity 
score of 0).  
In terms of policy, the use of high stakes or minimum competency exams is evident in the 
majority of Canadian educational jurisdictions. Seeing that all the provinces that employ such 
assessment tools also score higher in net reactivity than the three provinces that do not use them 
should give ministry officials reason to reconsider their use. If the use of high stakes exams is 
correlated to TTT effects, it is of no help in reaching stated goals for improved teaching. 
 
Pressure 
 
The most significant of the variables within the incentives scale is perceived pressure. 
Teachers reported feeling high levels of pressure despite the Canadian context of LSA showing 
notably less professional consequence for educators as compared to US policy models (Finnigan & 
Gross, 2007; Koretz, 2009). It seems obvious that the policy-based administration of pressure needs 
to be considered in terms of the effects it has on instructional practices. Where reactivity effects 
contradict fundamental policy goals both expectations and incentives should be re-evaluated.  
It is difficult for policy makers to control a fuzzy variable dealing with ‘perceptions’, but it 
should be emphasized that pressure is applied inadvertently, explicitly, or from educational 
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stakeholders (such as the community, students or parents). This pressure is strongly correlated to the 
use of TTT strategies. This ‘test anxiety for teachers’ is not conducive to meeting ministry policy 
targets. 
It may not seem particularly constructive to point out only things that policy makers and 
education ministry officials should not do. In fields of endeavour where there is the potential of 
harmful effects resulting from our actions, we could keep in mind that medicine’s ancient 
Hippocratic Oath begins with an admonition to ‘do no harm.’ This is what we would now call the 
precautionary principle – the practice of exercising caution when understanding is incomplete. When 
incentives are examined as a policy tool, the limiting of harm must be considered a primary goal 
since there is so very little to say about the positive influence that policy incentives have on 
pedagogical practice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The inclusion of incentives in provincial assessment policies across Canada has shown to be 
an effective means to promote the use of data in classrooms: teachers are significantly reactive to 
incentives. If this study did not differentiate between TTT and TTC reactivity effects, this would be 
seen as further proof that incentives are a suitable and appropriate lever. The main driver of this 
reactivity appears to be perceived pressure coming from test preparation, the high stress and 
sometimes secretive methods of test administration, and finally the public release of results. Explicit 
policy goals and guidelines for teacher conduct do not advocate teaching to the test as a preferred or 
effective instructional strategy, yet the LSA policies are equally likely to have this effect as they are to 
lead to teaching (to) the curriculum.  An educational experiment with such unpredictable outcomes 
can hardly be called a success. Only when it can said with some certainty what effect the pressure 
from incentives will have on teachers can policy makers claim to have achieved some measure of 
successful implementation. 
 Based on these results the obvious conclusion is that for too long the model based on 
incentives, themselves inspired by capitalist economic models, have been used to guide policy in the 
public sphere. This is despite growing evidence that even in business incentives have unintended 
consequences (see, for example, Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein & Mazar, 2009). It seems equally 
apparent that policies built on the presumption of ‘improvement’ should be tested against objective 
criteria that accurately gauge their practical effects. This program evaluation study has asked that 
basic question: whether assessment policy is actually meeting the outcomes originally put forward in 
ministry literature. 
The results of this research go some way to showing that incentive-based policies, especially 
those rooted on high-pressure testing, do not result in better instructional practices since TTC 
improvements are eclipsed by changes to TTT methods (as in Table 2). Whether or not increasing 
LSA scores indicate improved teaching (and this is an important question not explored here), high 
quality instruction is the stated and laudable goal of all education ministries in Canada. In order to 
achieve it, more objective examinations of the practical results of LSA must be conducted and 
examined with a critical eye. Being the basis of a large research study, the author has several papers 
built on this very premise which all examine the practical effects of LSAs on teaching in Canadian 
public schools using the reactivity model. It is hoped that these papers and the ongoing research on 
assessment will help policy makers avoid the possible unintended consequences of incentives-based 
programs and both devise and implement LSAs that support and promote the more effective 
instructional strategies which help teachers teach (to) the curriculum. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 The charts found in this appendix are intended to provide more information regarding the 
study parameters and results. Where the preceding paper does not provide a sufficient amount of 
detail, often in the interest of space, the appendices will hopefully make these points clear. What 
follows is: a) Spearman’s rank order correlation tests for incentives scale items; b) Cronbach’s alpha 
scores for reactivity scale and incentives scale items; c) descriptive statistical data for incentives 
variables; and in Appendix 2, d) the survey instrument questions with the ascribed numerical values 
in parenthesis. 
 
 
Figure A1: Spearman's rank order correlation test for incentive scale items. 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Cronbach’s alpha scores for reactivity scale items.  
All scores are within reasonable bounds, whereas alphas for TTT and TTC items separately are lower as a 
result of the small number of included items.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Expectation to use data 1.000
(2) Follow up on data use 0.472*  1.000
(3) Perceived pressure 0.201*  0.199*  1.000
(4) Results awareness 0.311*  0.286*  0.138*  1.000
(5) Perceived stakes 0.261*  0.212* 0.158*  0.401*  1.000
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Item
n
Item-test 
correlation
Item-rest 
correlation
Average inter-
item covariance
Alpha
Look for PD 413 0.530 0.389 0.029 0.722
Request resources 408 0.574 0.429 0.028 0.717
Work with other teachers 410 0.496 0.335 0.029 0.730
Cover a wider range 409 0.473 0.287 0.029 0.741
Offer study groups 408 0.477 0.310 0.029 0.735
Cover tested content well 414 0.649 0.543 0.027 0.704
Teach test-taking strategies 410 0.585 0.455 0.028 0.714
Use similar classroom tests 412 0.635 0.521 0.027 0.705
Focus on tested subjects 409 0.523 0.352 0.028 0.730
Review old exams 414 0.619 0.474 0.027 0.709
Test scale 0.028 0.742
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Figure A3: Cronbach’s alpha for incentive scale items.  
The higher n for expectation and follow up data is a result of the inclusion of all surveyed teachers in these item 
responses, whether or not they gave LSAs in their classrooms. Comparisons of the two groups are found below 
in figures A9 and A11. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Provincial / national data on the perceived expectation to use LSA data.  
The national average is relatively in line with most provincial numbers, but the low n for provincial survey data 
makes detailed analysis problematic. 
 
 
 
Item
n
Item-test 
correlation
Item-rest 
correlation
Average inter-
item covariance
Alpha
Expectation to use data 1071 0.813 0.597 0.141 0.697
Follow up on data use 1071 0.612 0.397 0.166 0.643
Perceived pressure 411 0.441 0.36 0.231 0.732
Aware of class results 369 0.582 0.415 0.187 0.695
Aware of school results 363 0.666 0.526 0.173 0.672
Aware of division result 359 0.585 0.381 0.182 0.700
Perceived stakes 410 0.387 0.291 0.233 0.735
Test scale 0.189 0.731
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Figure A5: Respondents rated following up on instructional change.  
National averages align well with most provincial responses. 
 
 
 
Figure A6: Breaking down expectations and follow up on data use by jurisdictions.  
National data are shown here to illuminate from which jurisdictional level responding teachers reported 
expectations and follow up. 
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Figure A7: Averaging results-awareness scores across class, school and divisional levels.  
Self-reported awareness is shown here, while awareness being not apparent came from respondents who did not 
know or receive LSA data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8: Teachers reported how much pressure they feel in relation to LSA testing. 
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Figure A9: Teachers rated the level of stakes they think are applied to teachers by LSAs. 
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Appendix 2 
The Survey Instrument 
 
This survey was written for Survey Monkey which allowed it to be emailed to teachers and 
results compiled electronically.  The square-bracketed values beside the survey responses indicate 
values assigned to responses which may help inform the analysis of regressions. Where they do not 
appear, they were not assigned or used in this fashion. Positive values were applied to factors 
thought to increase teacher use of LSA data. Lesser and negative values were applied to factors 
thought to impede or decrease the use of these data.  
Both the survey and the interview data gathering covered more ground than was discussed in 
this paper. Other topics are found in papers that have been published or that should be forthcoming. 
This paper uses survey data from only the third (reactivity) and fifth (incentives) sections. 
 
Background Information 
 
1. Consent to terms of survey: Yes; No 
2. Age:  18-24;  25-34;  35-44;  45-54;  55-64;  65+ 
3. Gender: Male; Female 
4. Grades taught: Kindergarten or pre-K; Elementary (grades 1-5); Middles years (grades 6-8); High 
school (grades 9-12) 
5. Teaching experience: 0-4 years; 5-9 years; 10-14 years; 15-19 years; 20-24 years; 25+ 
6. School setting:  Urban setting; Suburban; Rural; Northern or remote 
7. Staff size:  Less than 15; 15-24; 24-34; 35-44; 45+ 
8. Class size:  1-10 students; 11-15; 16-20; 21-25; 26-30; 31+ 
9. Qualifications: College or high school; University but no BEd; University and BEd; Graduate 
studies but not completed Masters; Graduate studies with completed Masters or more 
10. Subject area credentials: Indicate a major and/or a minor in – English; Mathematics; Science; 
Social Sciences; Other   
11. School division 
12. Voluntary email address (for selection of future interview respondents) 
13. I give provincial tests in my classroom:  Yes; No 
 
Test Design and Results Data 
 
14. Which tests does your class(es) take? English; Mathematics; Science; Social Studies; Other 
15. Results are returned: The same school year [1]; The next school year [-0.5]; The results are not 
returned to me [-1]; I'm not sure [-1] 
16. Results compare: Divisions with other divisions; Schools with other schools; Teachers with other 
teachers; Students with other students (for all 'Yes' responses [1]; all 'No' responses [-0.5]; all 'I'm not 
sure' responses [-1]; all 'I do not see the results' responses [-1])   
17. Results are returned by: Department heads [1]; Administration [1]; Divisional personnel [1]; 
Ministry personnel [1]; I do not see the results [-1]; I'm not sure [-1]; Other (written response) 
18. Are the results easy to understand?   Yes, they are easy to understand as presented [1];   I have an 
incomplete understanding of the results as presented [-0.5]; I do not understand them as presented [-
1];   I do not see the results [-1] 
19. Can you act directly to use these result to inform your instruction? Yes, we can act directly [1]; 
Some interpretation is needed before we can act [-0.5]; We cannot act directly because teachers are 
responsible for analysis [-1]; We cannot act because the results are poorly or incompletely presented 
[-1] 
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20. Which kind of test items are used too much or too rarely: Selected response; Short constructed 
response; Longer constructed response (all 'Used too much' responses [-1]; all 'Used too rarely' 
responses [-1]; all 'Current use is appropriate' responses [1]. 
 
Using the Data (Reactivity responses, as reported in Author 2016b) 
 
21. Have you ever been involved in writing or marking provincial assessments? Yes; No 
22. Changes in instruction 1: I have looked for PD to improve my instructional strategies; I have 
requested additional resources related to testing; I have worked with other teachers to make sense of 
the data; I cover a wider range of topics in the curriculum; I hold group study session or provide 
extra help after school (all 'Not at all' responses [0]; all 'Somewhat' responses [0.5]; all 'A great deal' 
responses [1]) 
23. Changes in instruction 2: I cover material I know will be on the test very thoroughly; I focus 
more on test-taking strategies like 'the process of elimination'; I use the format of the test to give 
similar types of practice questions; I focus more on subjects that have provincial tests; I review old 
exams (all 'Not at all' responses [0]; all 'Somewhat' responses [-0.5]; all 'A great deal' responses [-1]). 
  
Supports (as reported in Author 2017b) 
 
24. Do you share results with following year's teachers: Never [-1]; Sometimes [0]; Always [1] 
25. Are results from last year's teachers shared with you? Never [-1]; Sometimes [0]; Always [1] 
26. Supports provided: PD; PLCs; Assessment teams; Administrative support; Printed or online 
guides; Coaching and/or mentoring; Other (written response) – (all supports as provided by any one 
of school, division, or ministry scored [1]) 
27. Helpfulness of supports: School supports; Division supports; Ministry supports (all 'Very helpful' 
responses [1]; all 'Helpful' responses [0.5]; all 'Not helpful' responses [-0.5]; all 'Not provided' 
responses [-1]. 
 
Incentives (reported in this paper) 
 
28. Expectation to use data from: School administration [1]; Division [1]; Ministry [1]; No 
expectation of use [-1] 
29. Follow up on use from: School administration [1]; Division [1]; Ministry [1]; There is no follow 
up on use [-1]; Other (written response) 
30. Perceived pressure: None [0]; A small amount [0.5]; A great deal [1] 
31. Results recollection/awareness: Class results; School results; Division results (all responses 
showing recollection [1]; all responses showing no recollection [-1]). Responses listed for each were: 
Better than average; About the same as average; Worse than average; I do not recall; These results 
are not provided. 
32. Perceived stakes (for teachers and schools): High [1]; Medium [0.5]; Low [0]. 
 
Attitudes about Testing (reported in Author 2016a) 
All responses in the following sections are scored -1 for 'Disagree', 1 for 'Agree', and 0 for 'Neither 
agree nor disagree.' 
 
33. Provincial testing:  a. Is a good way to evaluate a school 
(School Accountability) b. Is an accurate indicator of a school's quality 
34. Provincial testing:  a. Determines if students meet qualification requirements 
(Student Accountability) b. Makes parents better aware of student growth 
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    c. Selects students for education /  employment opportunities 
35. Provincial testing:  a. Identifies student strengths and weaknesses 
(School Improvement)  b. Helps students improve their learning 
    c. Is integrated with teaching practice 
    d. Allows different students to get different instruction 
    e. Changes the way teachers teach 
36. Provincial testing:  a. Interferes with appropriate teaching 
(Negative test attitudes) b. Data only get used when stakes are high 
    c. Has little impact on teaching practices 
    d. Results are filed and ignored 
    e. Is an imprecise process 
 
37. Appropriate uses: Assign or re-assign students to classes; Identify learning needs of students who 
are struggling; Discuss student progress or instructional strategies with other educators; Form small 
groups of students for targeted instruction; Discuss data with a parent; Discuss data with a student; 
Choose which parents to contact; Meet a specialist about data – e.g. instructional coach (all 
'Appropriate' responses [1]; all 'Not appropriate responses [-1]) 
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